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THE IMPACT OF COGNITIVE BIAS ON
PERSUASION AND WRITING STRATEGIES
INTRODUCTION
Marilyn R. Walter and Elizabeth Fajans†
Research into the psychology of decision-making has
demonstrated that people rely on mental shortcuts to ease the
burden of processing complex and ambiguous information. These
shortcuts, known as heuristics and biases, sometimes lead to faulty
judgments because they are naturalistic and intuitive (involving,
for example, “gut instincts” and personal experience) rather than
rational consideration of the information presented.
The legal profession has explored the role of cognitive biases
in many domains, ranging from their influence on jury and
judiciary decision-making to their impact on negotiation. This
symposium, The Impact of Cognitive Bias on Persuasion and
Writing Strategies, refocused the discussion by looking at the
function and role of cognitive bias in legal writing. It explored both
the persuasive power and the related ethical challenges of
cognitive bias in this realm, with an emphasis on improving legal
writing and legal writing strategies. The panels, which were
moderated by Marilyn Walter and Elizabeth Fajans, exemplified
the myriad ways cognitive bias influences audience.
Lawrence Solan’s opening paper, Four Reasons to Teach
Psychology to Legal Writing Students, explains that the heuristics
we use to reason efficiently and to good ends can also lead to
errors in reasoning and judgment because we all have
psychological propensities—cognitive biases—that undermine
* Marilyn R. Walter is a Professor of Law and Director of the Writing Program
at Brooklyn Law School.
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logical reasoning. He argues that teaching students about the
cognitive propensities that interfere with effective communication
may help them to understand the underlying grounds for their
teachers’ criticisms and suggestions, to master basic legal writing
skills, and to assist them in transferring those skills to other legal
tasks.
Solan focuses on four biases that play out in legal documents.
Knowledge of these, he argues, enables lawyers to adjust their
writing, and, within ethical bounds, to stave off or exploit them.
These include the psychological propensity to appreciate plain,
simple writing; the confirmation bias, which is a tendency to seek
and value conclusions already reached at the expense of contrary
evidence; the correspondence bias, which is an inclination to
overemphasize the importance of a person’s character and to
underemphasize the effect of context on conduct; and the bias
blind spot, which make it harder for us to recognize our own biases
than to recognize the biases of others. Solan concludes with some
suggestions on how to introduce these concepts in the legal writing
classroom with exercises that will motivate students to internalize
their lessons.
Michael R. Smith argues in The Sociological and Cognitive
Dimensions of Policy-based Persuasion that familiarity with the
mental processes involved in policy-based persuasion enables
advocates to produce more effective policy arguments and to
appreciate the differences between policy arguments and deductive
rule-based reasoning. Because policy arguments advocate for a
new rule advancing or protecting a social value, the different or
competing social values of judges can lead to more varied
decisions from those based on deductive reasoning. They thus
require greater awareness of how cognitive processes affect policybased decision-making.
Smith explains four general cognitive processes relevant to
policy-based persuasion and, within each of the four, explores
specific cognitive strategies legal advocates can employ. . The first
process is fear of future loss. According to Smith, policy
arguments based on protecting a future social value are more
effective than policy arguments applying to the case currently
before the court as well as to future cases. Cognitive phenomena
like the uncertainty effect and status quo bias indicate that
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arguments that warn of future loss are more persuasive than those
warning of immediate impact because the uncertainty that future
predictions are imbued with increases fear. Second, policy-based
persuasion is more likely to succeed if advocates prove the high
probability of asserted consequences. They can effectively do so
by using relevant non-legal materials and by exploiting cognitive
processes like the conjunctive fallacy and the availability heuristic.
Third, policy arguments depend on establishing the importance of
the social value at stake. Several cognitive phenomena—loss
aversion, the endowment effect, and the negative bias—suggest an
advocate can enhance a decision-maker’s perceived importance of
a value by phrasing arguments in terms of avoiding loss instead of
acquiring a gain. The final cognitive process relevant to policy
persuasion is memorability, requiring the persuader to use
rhetorical strategies that highlight a point and render an argument
more memorable to the reader.
In What Cognitive Dissonance Tells Us about Tone in
Persuasion, Kathryn Stanchi explains that advocacy often puts
people in a state of cognitive dissonance, an uncomfortable
psychological state where ambiguity, contradiction, and
inconsistency cause people’s deeply held beliefs to clash. To
eliminate that dissonance, that conflict, people respond either by
changing their beliefs or behaviors, by rationalizing their beliefs or
behavior, or by re-conceiving the situation or reality—that is,
changing the narrative—to make it comport with their beliefs.
Knowledge about these reactions to cognitive dissonance, she
notes, can be put to rhetorical advantage if advocates are aware of
what situations create dissonance and decide whether avoiding or
resolving dissonance is most beneficial to the client. Thus, for
example, an aggressive, hard-line message that creates dissonance
may backfire because the recipient may think the argument is too
one-sided to be true and begin looking for flaws. In this situation, it
is better to avoid the dissonance and to take a more measured
approach. Stanchi concludes that cognitive dissonance studies
suggest that strategies that ease a person toward accepting a
controversial claim are the surest way of dispelling cognitive
discomfort and achieving the advocate’s goal.
Daniel Medwed views cognitive bias in a different context in
his essay The Good Fight: The Egocentric Bias, the Aversion to
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Cognitive Dissonance and American Criminal Law. He first
acknowledges that the phrase “cognitive bias” often has negative
connotations. But he then suggests that for the criminal law
practitioner, two interrelated cognitive biases—the egocentric bias
and the aversion to cognitive dissonance—could be potential
assets. He begins by describing the egocentric bias, in which
people interpret information and envision themselves in ways that
promote a positive self-image, regardless of whether that image is
warranted. However, the need to maintain this positive self-image
may lead people to minimize evidence that would detract from that
image and create cognitive dissonance. Medwed illustrates this
theory by focusing on the need of both defense attorneys and
prosecutors to validate or even idealize their roles in the criminal
process. This validation both creates a psychological shell that
protects against indignities and builds a layer of confidence that
empowers lawyers to convince others of the legitimacy of their
positions. Medwed sees this occurring as lawyers develop a theory
of the case, determine which crime to charge at the plea bargaining
stage, and present their case at trial – all important stages of the
criminal justice system.
In Metaphor and Analogy: The Sun and Moon of Legal
Persuasion, Linda Berger suggests that novel characterizations and
metaphors may compete with entrenched stereotypes (cognitive
biases) and conventional categories and make the recipient open to
new perspectives and narratives. This insight can aid lawyers in
making conscious choices about persuasion. Establishing a
foundation for this argument, Berger first notes that according to
social cognition researchers, we perceive and interpret new
information by following a process of schematic cognition, in
which the new data is analogized to the knowledge structures
embedded in our memories. Researchers have divided the next
step, the decision-making process, into intuitive or analytic
systems. Some researchers, like Daniel Kahneman, view intuition
as often leading to decisions marked by mistakes and
overconfidence. Others, represented by the experimental
psychologist Gary Klein, point out the value of intuition during
decision-making because it alerts the problem solver to an
analogous pattern. Berger then applies these principles to the
processing of analogy and metaphor, contrasting the work of
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psychologist Dedre Gentner with that of linguist George Lakoff
and philosopher Mark Johnson. For purposes of legal persuasion,
she concludes that while conventional metaphors involve only the
retrieval of automatic categories, interpretation of novel metaphors
may prompt the reader to create meaning and prompt a new way of
seeing.
Berger then notes the differences between analogy and
metaphor. Analogy, she states, has an explicit literal predictive or
explanatory effect, e.g., a corporation is like a person. Metaphors
are somewhat different. They vary more in structure than do
analogies, may involve an ambiguous and more non-literal use of
language, and are more associated with emotion and expression
than analogy. Applied to legal persuasion, since novel metaphors
may cause the reader to see things in a different way, they are
particularly useful to a lawyer in constructing a theory of the case,
in framing what the audience perceives, and in channeling the
audience’s interpretation of an event. Finally, Berger draws upon
several case studies to illustrate how novel characterizations and
metaphors may provide alternative schemas or structures to
counter the effects of stereotypes, to prompt reflective comparison
rather than automatic categorization within a particular context,
and to activate a persuasive master story.
In the final article, A Lawyer’s Hidden Persuader: Genre Bias,
Bret Rappaport suggests that genre be considered a kind of
cognitive bias. Like other cognitive biases, genre in the legal
context may skew rational thought in two ways. It constrains the
texts that lawyers and judges use in specific circumstances
(criminal lawyers, patent lawyers, environmental lawyers, divorce
judges), and it influences readers. Indeed, Rappaport reasons that
the work of both lawyers and judges is limited by a highly
structured set of conventions.
Applying these theories, Rappaport turns first to two
transactional document genres, patent applications and wills, to
show how these highly structured genres function in the real legal
world. For transactional documents, he recommends against never
altering genre conventions, since these documents must be
timeless, multi-purpose, and infinite. However, with persuasive
documents, and in particular the appellate brief—a litigation subgenre—he somewhat modifies his advice. Although he recognizes
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the importance of reader expectations—here, the court— he
acknowledges that a compelling reason may at times justify the
risk of confounding reader expectations by breaking with
convention. He concludes by stating that lawyers who view law
and legal writing through the lens of genre bias will better
understand how legal texts are “conceived, received, and
perceived.”
The Impact of Cognitive Bias on Persuasion and Writing
Strategies took a valuable step towards encouraging the legal
community to becoming informed about the cognitive heuristics
and biases that invariably come into play when recipients read our
legal documents. Hopefully, the work of these symposium
panelists will motivate others to continue this critical dialogue.1
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Michael Higdon also participated in the symposium.

